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TAKING THE BUNDLE OF RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 
Jesse Wall* 
After a painfully long set up, that attempts to ground three claims about property law (in general) and 
the nature of the beneficial interest (in particular), this article considers two arguments about the law 
of discretionary trusts. The first is the bundle of rights argument. This argument concerns the 
interpretation of "property" in legislative provisions. It suggests that where legislation is concerned 
with the structure of the social relationships that property institutions facilitate (rather that the 
juridical structure of rights and duties under property law), interpretations regarding what amounts 
to a "property" interest should also be "functional" (rather than "formalistic"). The second argument 
is the concept of the illusory trust. This argument concerns the standard package of constitutive 
elements required by trust law when a settlor uses the trust institution to order his or her affairs. 
Where an ostensible trust lacks a constitutive element, it can be said to be illusory. I consider here 
recent attempts to further delineate the concept of the illusory trust, that look to the "substance" or 
"reality" of the trust, and in doing so, shift our attention away from juridical form and onto social 
function. I will argue that only the former argument needs to be taken seriously. 
According to the Law Commission's Review of the Law of Trusts, "[n]o coherent basis for the 
bundle of rights has been articulated to date, so it is difficult to predict what course the courts will 
take in the future".1 This article aims to provide a coherent basis for the bundle of rights theory of 
trust property. To do so, this article needs to articulate three preliminary claims. The first claim is that 
both a property right, and the beneficial interest under a trust, can be understood in terms of their 
juridical form of rights and duties or their functional structure of social relationships. The second is 
that we should understand the moral ends of property law, and the moral ends of the law of trusts, as 
either serving one underlying value or serving a plurality of values. The third claim is that, in order to 
advance the view that property law or trust law serves a plurality of values, it is necessary to adopt 
the functional view of property. Against this backdrop, this article will consider two arguments: the 
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bundle of rights theory and the concept of the illusory trust. Whilst the "bundle of rights theory" is a 
coherent argument concerning the interpretation of "property" in legislative provisions, no coherent 
basis for the concept of the illusory trust has been articulated to date.  
This article is structured like a Punnett square. Part I(A) is concerned with the form, function – 
and moral ends – of property. Part I(B) is concerned with the form, function – and moral ends – of the 
beneficial interest. Part II(A) constructs an argument (the bundle of rights) that depends on a 
functional interpretation of "property" in light of a plurality of moral ends that property law might 
serve. Part II(B) then considers an argument (the concept of the illusory trust) that depends on a 
functional interpretation of the beneficial interest in the light of a plurality of moral ends that trust law 
might serve. 
I PART ONE 
A Property  
The purpose of this Part is to isolate "the bundle of rights theory" in the context of property law 
theory in general. This provides a prelude to articulating the basis of the bundle of rights theory in 
trust law (at Part II(A)) as well as introducing the two distinctions relied upon in the analysis of both 
the beneficial interest (at Part I(B)) and the limits of the concept of the trust (at Part II(B)). 
Specifically, this Part will distinguish between a "formal" and "functional" explanation of property 
law, and between a "monistic" and "pluralistic" explanation of the moral ends of property law. It will 
then connect the functional explanation of property with the debate on the moral ends of property law. 
These three manoeuvres – differentiating form and function, identifying different valuable ends, and 
connecting function with value – are overemphasised in this Part, as they provide the analytical 
structure for the remainder of this article. 
But first, we need some tools with which to tackle the apparent competition between the 
explanations. So, allow me to start by introducing some technical language about explanations. An 
explanation has two parts. An explanation has an explanandum: a "sentence describing the 
phenomenon to be explained",2 and an explanans: a class of sentences which can "account for the 
phenomenon".3 When we consider competing theoretical explanations of a phenomenon we need to 
consider whether the explanations have the same explanandum. Sometimes distinct explananda 
masquerade as competing explananda when the "sentence describing the phenomenon to be 
explained" is not articulated well. For example, if you walked into the kitchen and asked me "why is 
there smoke?" you have identified an explanandum (the phenomenon of smoke) and asked for an 
explanans (an account of the phenomenon of smoke). I might then respond to the question with an 
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explanans: "because something is on fire". Despite my explanans providing the most accurate account 
of phenomena to be explained, you would be frustrated with my response. Your frustration stems from 
my narrow interpretation of the way you articulated the explanandum. To better articulate the 
explanandum, what you should have asked is "what is on fire?" since that is, most likely, the 
explanation that you sought when you walked into the kitchen. The two questions – why is there 
smoke? and what is on fire? – represent different explananda (smoke; fire) that call for different 
explanans. The implication here is that, unless the explanandum is properly articulated, we can 
mistake different explanans for competing explanans. 
In the light of this, let us turn to consider theoretical explanations of property. On one theoretical 
account of property rights, "the differentiating feature of a system of property" is "the [moral] right of 
the owner to act as the exclusive gatekeeper of the owned thing".4 A property right is, on this account, 
the right to exclude all others from an object, asset or resource. This is the "right to exclude theory" 
of property. On another theoretical account, property rights represent "an open-ended set" of 
"activities" or "privileges", that include the ability to possess, consume, derive income from, control, 
manage, transfer, exchange, sell, borrow against, or otherwise use, the object, asset or resource.5 This 
is the "bundle of rights theory". Property, it would seem, represents either the right to exclude or a 
bundle of rights. As I will explain here, both accounts are accurate explanans of different explananda. 
They explain a different set of phenomena that we can identify in the exercise of property rights. 
The exclusionary account of property rights, that takes the right to exclude all others from the 
object, asset or resource as the defining feature of a property right, is an account of the juridical form 
of property rights. Property rights exhibit a particular legal structure; property rights are enforceable 
against an open set of persons (are rights in rem), are actionable per se and impose correlative duties 
of non-interference.6 The "right to exclude" becomes shorthand for this legal structure that is 
organised around the idea that the rights-holder has the moral right to exclude all others from the 
object, asset or resource. The moral right to exclude is able to account for – or explain – this legal 
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form.7 Hence, for Thomas Merrill, it is "necessary to posit independently" the right to exclude as the 
differentiating feature of a system of property in order to account for the legal form of property rights.8 
The juridical form or structure of property rights is the explanandum that the exclusionary theory of 
property is able to explain. 
Whilst the exclusionary theory of property can explain the legal form or structure of the law, the 
bundle theory of property can account for the privileges and entitlements (the "incidents of ownership" 
or the "bundle of rights") that "sit behind" the form and structure of property rights.9 That is, it can 
explain how property law functions to enable the exercise of an open-ended set of privileges and 
entitlements in an object or resource. Property rights, therefore, protect an open-ended set of uses 
implicitly by giving the owner the right to exclude others from the asset,10 and the various privileges 
and entitlements in an object or resource "are mere elaborations of what the right to exclude 
encompasses or entails".11 By enabling the rights-holder to exclude all others from an object, asset or 
resource, the right to exclude "indirectly serves a wide – and, crucially, only vaguely specified – set 
of interests".12 The right to exclude others from an asset or resource renders "a protected sphere of 
indefinite and undefined activity, in which an owner may do anything with the things he owns".13 
Within the formally "indefinite and undefined" sphere of activity, the law functions to protect a rather 
full bundle of rights. 
We, therefore, arrive at different explanans of different explananda. Where the phenomena that 
calls for explanation is the juridical relationship between right-holders and duty-bearers, then the 
alienable right to exclude provides a sound explanation of the phenomenon. Where the phenomenon 
that calls for explanation is how property rights facilitate the relationship between people and 
resources, then the bundle of rights view provides a sound explanation of the phenomenona. Rather 
than being competing accounts of property rights, the right to exclude and the bundle of rights are 
complementary accounts. They are, in other words, different views of the same cathedral.  
  
7  Note that exclusion is only half of the formal or structural story. As Penner explains, property rights are also 
"separable" or alienable in the sense that "only those 'things' in the world which are contingently associated 
with any particular owner may be objects of property": see Penner, above n 6, at 111.  
8  Thomas W Merrill "Property and the Right to Exclude" (1998) 77 Neb L Rev 730 at 744.  
9  Henry E Smith "Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation between Ends and Means in American Property Law" 
(2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 959 at 963. 
10  Henry E Smith "Property and Property Rules" (2004) 79 NYU L Rev 1719 at 1759. 
11  Hanoch Dagan "Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law" (2012) 112 Colum L Rev 1409 at 1414–1415. 
12  Henry E Smith "Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation between Ends and Means in American Property Law", 
above n 9, at 964.  
13  Penner, above n 6, at 72.  
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However, whilst the alienable right to exclude can explain the juridical form and legal structure 
of property rights, the exclusionary theory cannot explain the value of property rights. As Henry E 
Smith makes clear, "[e]xclusion is not the most important or 'core' value because it is not a value at 
all".14 Even for the most reclusive rights-holder, there is no value – in and of itself – in being able to 
exclude others from an object, asset, or resource. In order to understand the value of property rights – 
in order to understand how property rights are a means of serving some kind of valuable ends – we 
need to consider the entitlements, activities and privileges that property rights enable and protect. As 
I will explain here, property rights serve valuable ends by allocating and protecting a bundle of rights: 
by enabling a right-holder to possess, consume, derive income from, control, manage, transfer, 
exchange (and so on) objects, assets and resources. 
One way to understand the valuable ends of property is the satisfaction of the individual right-
holder's preferences (or the exercise of his or her autonomy). The "one constant meaning" and "core 
purpose" of property, Gregory Alexander explains, has been "to define in material terms the legal and 
political sphere within which individuals are free to satisfy their own preferences, free from 
governmental coercion or other forms of external interference".15 Hence, it is our interest in the use 
and control of objects and resources – our interest in "purposefully dealing with things"16 – that 
animates property rights with moral significance. Whilst the right to exclude formally protects this 
interest, our interest in purposefully dealing with things is elucidated through the various ways in 
which we use objects, assets and resources; through possessing, consuming, deriving income from, 
managing, transferring and so on. If property is a means of securing a person's use and control of an 
object, asset and resource, then the bundle theory of property is able to elucidate this valuable end, in 
a way that the exclusionary theory cannot.  
Note that property, in the way just expressed, furthers a monistic value. That is, the valuable ends 
can be understood with sole reference to the right-holder's interest in "purposely dealing with things" 
(or, satisfying the right-holder's preferences, expressing the right-holder's will, or exercising the right-
holder's autonomy). We could, in comparison, cast the net wider and consider the further ends that 
property law might seek to serve. On a value pluralistic view, the "main function of property is to 
structure social relations".17 This requires "a moral vision of what type of social relationships it seeks 
to foster".18  
  
14  Henry E Smith "Property as the Law of Things" (2012) 125 Harv L Rev 1691 at 1705. 
15  Gregory S Alexander "Property as Propriety" (1998) 77 Neb L Rev 667 at 667.  
16  Penner, above n 6, at 71 
17  Gregory S Alexander "Pluralism and Property" (2011) 80 Fordham L Rev 1017 at 1023. 
18  At 1023.  
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On most pluralistic views, the moral ends of property are "a pluralistic set of liberal values: 
autonomy, utility, labour, personhood, community, and distributive justice".19 It then follows for 
Dagan that property law "tailors different configurations of entitlements to different property 
institutions".20 Through these different configurations, each property institution is "designed to match 
the specific balance between property values best suited to its characteristic social setting". 21 
Examples include: residential tenancy law (that protects aspects of personal identity or personhood);22 
laws that govern relationship property division (that engage values of community sharing and 
distributive justice);23 and intellectual property (where there is a greater emphasis on utilitarian 
norms).24 These are all examples of a normative ballast that acts as a counterweight to autonomy or 
individual preference satisfaction of the property rights-holder.  
Hence, there is an important distinction between valuable ends that property rights serve. Such 
ends can be understood as monistic (as serving one value) or pluralistic (as serving a range of values). 
Fortunately, with careful use of the language of "rights" and "law", we demarcate these monistic and 
pluralistic views. I will refer to "property rights" as serving the individual preference satisfaction 
whilst using "property law" to refer to the pluralistic task of "structuring the social relations" between 
individuals. 
The key point which I wish to labour here is that this contrast between the valuable end(s) that 
property can serve is a contrast that is only visible through the lens of the bundle of rights theory of 
property: on the monistic account, by securing a bundle of privileges and entitlements for an 
individual rights-holder, property rights enable the rights-holder to satisfy his or her preferences; on 
the pluralistic account, in order to pursue a moral vision of the type of rights social relationships that 
ought to be fostered, property law can reallocate the bundle between potential rights-holders. Hence, 
"policy-motivated adjustments" to the bundle of rights "usually involve adding or subtracting sticks 
and reallocating them among concerned parties or to society".25 Once we view property law 
functionally, we can appreciate how the law might allocate and divide up the bundle of rights with a 
view of tailoring "different configurations of entitlements" that are "best suited to its characteristic 
social setting".26 I, therefore, suggest that, if the explanandum concerns the values that animate 
  
19  Dagan, above n 11, at 1412–1413.  
20  At 1412–1413. 
21  At 1412–1413. 
22  At 1441; and Margaret Jane Radin "Property and Personhood" (1982) 34 Stan L Rev 957 at 992 and 1013.  
23  Dagan, above n 11, at 1439. 
24  At 1411. 
25  Henry E Smith "Property as the Law of Things", above n 14, at 1697. 
26  Dagan, above n 11, at 1412–1413. 
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property law with moral significance, then the bundle of rights theory provides the best available 
explanans.  
Allow me to highlight three main analytical manoeuvres attempted here. First, I have suggested 
that there are two complementary explanations of property. The juridical form of property rights – its 
legal structure – can be adequately explained in terms of the right to exclude. The function of property 
rights – the social structure that it facilitates – can be explained in terms of a bundle of rights. Second, 
we can also identify two different accounts of the value, or moral ends, of property; as either only 
serving the autonomy or preferences of the rights-holder (value monism) or as serving a range of 
values, inclusive of individual preference satisfaction, but extending to include a range of social 
obligation norms (value pluralism). Third, I have also suggested here that our view of the contrast as 
to the valuable ends that a system of property rights serves is dependent upon adopting a functional 
lens, one that is concerned with how the law functions to structure the social relationships around 
objects, assets and resources. 
B The Beneficial Interest 
In this Part, I will attempt the same three analytical manoeuvres whilst turning our attention to the 
beneficial interest under an express trust. Dissolving the tension between the alienable right to exclude 
and the bundle of rights in general property theory has been, in part, a dress rehearsal for considering 
the nature of the beneficial interest. Armed with the distinction between formal and functional views, 
we can attempt to diffuse the tension between the "obligational" and "proprietary" theories of the 
nature of the beneficial interest. I will then consider the moral ends that an express trust might be said 
to serve, and (at this stage of the article) merely isolate an implication that follows from the monistic 
and pluralistic views of the value(s) of an express trust.  
Let us begin by viewing the express trust through the formal lens. If a property right represents 
the alienable right to exclude all others from an asset or resource, then when a settlor transfers an asset 
to the trustees of a trust, they are transferring the alienable right to exclude. That is, they are 
transferring rights that have a particular legal structure. The trustees, therefore, receive, and exercise, 
the alienable right to exclude all others from the trust asset. In receiving such rights under the terms 
of the trust, equity imposes obligations on the trustees: obligations that require the trustee to exercise 
their rights over the assets for the benefit of certain beneficiaries. 
As we can see, when viewed through the formal lens, the trust represents an obligation imposed 
on the trustee to exercise their property right in a way specified. As Lionel Smith explains, "the trustee 
has rights in the object; that is, rights in the trust property" and the "beneficiary's rights are the 
converse of the obligations owed by the trustee to the beneficiary".27 It follows that the beneficiary 
does not obtain property rights under the trust. Rather, the beneficiary obtains a right that is 
  
27  Lionel D Smith "Trust and Patrimony" (2008) 38 Revue Générale de Droit 379 at 392.  
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exercisable against the trustees' property rights in the trust assets. It follows, for instance, that "if a 
third party wrongfully causes damage to the trust property", Smith identifies, "there is no claim by a 
beneficiary against the third party".28 The right of the beneficiary is not a right exercisable against an 
open set of people (a right in rem) that can be enforced by the beneficiary against a third party. More 
broadly, the rights of beneficiaries cannot be property rights – in the formal sense – since "the trust 
beneficiary has no equivalent direct right to exclude others from … the trust asset".29 Viewed through 
a formal lens, the nature of the beneficial interest is, therefore, a non-proprietary interest. The 
beneficial interest is the corollary of the set of personal obligations imposed on the trustees as 
recipients of property under a trust. 
In comparison, viewed functionally, the nature of the beneficial interest is a proprietary interest. 
When a settlor transfers an asset to the trustees of a trust, the trustees receive "powers of title". These 
"powers of title held by the trustee",30 JE Penner explains, are the:31 
… powers to transfer, confer rights in, or otherwise dispose of … the right to possess tangibles or the right 
(through legal action or equitable suit) to realise the value of intangibles.  
The value of trust assets is (typically) realised through the acts of exchange, sale or reinvestment; it 
is not realised through the exercise of the rights "to immediate, exclusive possession".32 Although the 
right to exclude may protect the possession of the asset, the right to exclude is asserted by the trustees 
against interference as a way of protecting acts of exchange, sale and investment, thereby protecting 
the value of the trust asset.33 Whilst the beneficiaries under the trust do not have an interest in the 
rights that we associate with the formal structure of property rights, the beneficial interests lie "in their 
rights that the trustee exercise his [or her] power of title appropriately".34 The trustee must exercise 
his or her powers to exchange, sell or reinvest in a particular way in accordance with the beneficial 
interest. In this way, "the beneficiaries are the beneficial owners of the title to trust assets".35  
  
28  At 391. 
29  JE Penner "The (True) Nature of a Beneficiary's Equitable Proprietary Interest under a Trust" (2014) 27 CJLJ 
473 at 476; and Ben McFarlane and Robert Stevens "The Nature of Equitable Property" (2010) 4 J Eq 1 at 3–
4.  
30  Penner "The (True) Nature of a Beneficiary's Equitable Proprietary Interest under a Trust", above n 29, at 487 
(italics removed). 
31  At 487. 
32  At 483. 
33  At 483. 
34  At 483 (italics removed). 
35  At 487.  
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The beneficial interest is proprietary in the sense that the interest is located in the trust asset. Since 
the trustee exercises a set of powers in the trust asset, and since the rights of the beneficiary determine 
how those powers are exercised, the beneficiary has a legally protected interest in the trust asset. That 
is, the beneficiary has a legally protected interest in the bundle of powers that the trustee exercises; 
the beneficial interest is "in the trust asset".36 Whilst the powers and obligations of the trustees can 
multiply and fracture through complex trust arrangements, I suggest that they nonetheless crystallise 
around the "powers of title". That is, powers and duties, such as powers of appointment or duties to 
inform, are ultimately about the exchange, sale or reinvestment of the trust asset. It cannot be turtles 
all the way down. Rather, "the powers of title" provide the critical mass around which all trust powers 
and duties orbit. 
Penner, therefore, encourages a shift in focus, away from possession and the trustees' alienable 
right to exclude and towards "the powers of title held by the trustee".37 This is acknowledged as a 
shift from form to function.38 We are no longer explaining the beneficiaries' rights to trust property 
as a structure of rights that are exercisable against the alienable right to exclusion.39 Rather, we are 
now explaining the beneficiaries' rights function to require that the trustees exercise their powers of 
transfer, disposition and realisation of value, in some way that is beneficial to them; that is, the trust 
functions to allocate the bundle of rights into a particular configuration. Viewed functionally, the trust 
is a "configuration of rights": the trustees' powers to exchange, sell, reinvest the trust asset and the 
beneficiaries' rights to require the trustees to exercise these powers in a particular way.  
I suggest that we again arrive at different explanans of different explananda. Where the 
phenomenon that calls for explanation is the juridical relationship between trustees, beneficiaries and 
third parties, then the obligational theory provides a sound explanation of that phenomenon. Where 
the phenomenon that calls for explanation is how property rights facilities the relationship between 
trustees, beneficiaries and the trust asset, then the proprietary view provides a sound explanation of 
that phenomenon. 
Recall (from Part I(A)) that it is through the functional lens that we ought to consider the moral 
ends that the property institution serves. To understand the underlying point, rationale or purpose of 
the express trust, we need to approach the normative inquiry by considering the social structure that 
the express trust facilitates. If we understand the express trust in functional terms as a configuration 
  
36  At 500.  
37  At 495 (italics removed). 
38  At 484.  
39  Penner is nonetheless conceptually consistent with his above view that property rights are exclusive rights by 
emphasising that "the hallmark of a property right is not a right to exclusion, but a right to alienable 
exclusivity, which is the power to put another, a transferee into one's shoes as holder of an exclusive right": 
at 488–489 (italics removed).  
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of rights, then we must consider the moral ends that this configuration of rights might then serve. The 
instinctive response is to say that the configuration of rights serves as the moral ends of the settlor's 
intention; more specifically, his or her autonomy or preference satisfaction that the settlor's intention 
represents. The reason why the law gives effect to a prescribed configuration of rights is because the 
settlor, as property rights-holder, intended such a configuration. If property rights define a "legal and 
political sphere within which individuals are free to satisfy their own preferences"40 then giving effect 
to a settlor's intention is one instance of respecting this "protected sphere of indefinite and undefined 
activity, in which an owner may do anything with the things he owns".41 As we can readily appreciate, 
this is a value monistic account of the moral ends of the express trust. In the same way that we can 
view the moral ends of property rights as serving the preference satisfaction of the rights-holder, we 
can view the moral ends of the express trust as an instance of this monistic value.  
A value monistic account of the express trust has an important implication that I wish to highlight 
here (and pick up again at Part II(B)). The implication is that, if the moral ends of trust law is settlor 
autonomy, then there are no limits to configuration of rights that the law has reason to enforce. If the 
settlor intends a particular configuration of rights – where trustees are immune from liability, where 
trustees are not held accountable, where trustees exercise unfettered discretion as to their own benefit 
under the trust – then it is consistent with the value of settlor autonomy for the law to give effect to 
that configuration.  
The converse also holds. If we seek to prevent the settlor from creating "his [or her] local law for 
his [or her] autonomous trust",42 we need to identify a norm or something of value to counteract the 
settlor autonomy norm. We need to be able to show why "the law should prohibit settlors from creating 
trusts which differ from the trust concept as traditionally understood".43 Hence, understanding the 
moral ends of trust law as pluralistic, as engaging a range of values (and not just settlor autonomy), is 
necessary to explaining the trust as a particular configuration of rights (and not just the configuration 
that the settlor intended). 
As we shall see, this is what the concept of the illusory trust attempts to do. It attempts to prescribe 
a limit to the particular configuration of rights that the law ought to give effect to, but without 
articulating the coherent pluralistic basis to the moral ends of the express trust. We will return to this 
contention in Part II(B). Before then, we need to consider the "bundle of rights" argument in the next 
Part. The bundle of rights argument relies upon the contention formulated here, concerning the two 
  
40  Alexander "Property as Propriety", above n 15, at 667. 
41  Penner, above n 6, at 72. 
42  David Hayton "The Irreducible Core Content of Trusteeship" in AJ Oakley (ed) Trends in Contemporary 
Trust Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996) 47 at 48.  
43  Patrick Parkinson "Review Essay: 'Trends in Contemporary Trust Law by A Oakley'" (1998) 20 Syd LR 348 
at 353. 
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complementary explanations of the beneficial interest. That is, where the phenomenon that calls for 
explanation is the structure of juridical relationships in the express trust, then the beneficial interest is 
the corollary of personal obligations owed to the beneficiaries by the trustees. Where the phenomenon 
that calls for explanation is structure of social relationships with regard to the trust property, then the 
beneficial interest represents the set of rights that have been configured to be exercisable by the 
beneficiaries. 
II PART TWO 
A The Bundle of Rights  
Let us now overlay our functional and formal theories. In Part I(A), I suggested that "property" 
can be understood formally as the right to exclude or functionally as a bundle of rights. In Part I(B), I 
suggested that the beneficial interest can be understood formally as the corollary of the personal 
obligations owed by the trustee to the beneficiary, or functionally as the ability to determine how the 
"powers of title" are exercised. Now, the formal relationship is the juridical relationship. It explains 
the legal form or structure of the legal relationship between trustees and beneficiaries with regard to 
the trust property. As far as the courts may be concerned, the juridical relationship ought to be the 
focus. There seems to be no need for a court to look beyond justiciable rights and duties and consider 
how the law functions to shape the social relationship between people and property. 
Legislation, however, can necessitate a shift in focus from the formal to the functional. For 
instance, legislation may take aim at the assets held by debtors in light of a creditor's claim for 
restitution or corrective justice,44 alter assets held by parties to property settlement proceedings in 
recognition of non-financial contributions to the marriage or partnership,45 seek to assess the financial 
resources of individual when evaluating his or her access to legal aid,46 or assess financial resources 
of an individual when evaluating his or her obligation to contribute to taxation.47 The difficulty is 
that, if these legislative provisions concern "property" in the formal sense, then a beneficiary under a 
general discretionary trust has no proprietary interest in the trust property. Recall that, under the 
formal view, the beneficial interest is obligational and not proprietary. A beneficiary under a general 
discretionary trust has no legal or equitable interest in the trust property, but a mere expectation that 
the trustees' discretion may be exercised to his or her benefit.48 If we sustain the formal view, it then 
  
44  Property Law Act 2007, s 345. 
45  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 44, 44B and 44C; and Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 182. 
46  Legal Services Act 2000, s 8 and sch 1 (cl 4 and 5); and Legal Services Regulations 2006, reg 8(4). 
47  Income Tax Act 2007, s BG 1. 
48  Hunt v Muollo [2003] 2 NZLR 322 (CA) at [11]; and Gartside v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1968] AC 
553 (HL) at 607 per Lord Reid and 615 per Lord Wilberforce.  
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follows that the legislative provisions that aim to reallocate and redistribute "property" cannot capture 
the beneficial interest under a general discretionary trust. 
Sustaining the formal view in this context is a mistake. When a legislative provision aims to 
reallocate "property", it is attempting to limit or redistribute a privilege or entitlement in an object, 
asset or resource. That is, the legislative provision is seeking to make "policy-motivated adjustments" 
to the bundle of rights by "adding or subtracting sticks and reallocating them among concerned parties 
or to society".49 Legislative intervention with regards to "property" is intervention that is concerned 
with the social structure that property law facilitates.  
Take, for example, the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. It is clear that the Act is concerned with 
the social structure that property facilitates. Its stated purpose is to:50 
(a) to reform the law relating to the property of married couples and civil union couples, and of couples 
who live together in a de facto relationship;  
(b) to recognise the equal contribution of both spouses to the marriage partnership, or civil union 
partners to the civil union, and of de facto partners to the de facto relationship partner; and 
(c) to provide for a just division of the relationship property between the spouses or partners when their 
relationship ends … 
With regards to marriage partnerships, civil unions and de facto partnerships, the purpose of the Act 
is to restructure the relationship of the two people in the partnership and the property that each of 
them possessed, used, controlled, derived income from and so on. Relationship property legislation, 
such as this, promotes values of community sharing and distributive justice with "a moral vision of 
what type of social relationships it seeks to foster"51 by affirming that "men and women have equal 
status", that "all forms of contribution to … [a] partnership … are treated as equal", and that "a just 
division of relationship property has regard to the economic advantages or disadvantages to the … 
partners arising" from the partnership.52  
This is Bill Atkin's contention. As he explains:53  
The Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) is ostensibly about property but its policy goals are about 
people and the fair division of the property that was central to the couple's life.  
Atkin here is restricting himself to a formalistic understanding of property. The Property 
(Relationships) Act is still "about property", just property in a functional sense. The suggestion here 
  
49  Henry E Smith "Property as the Law of Things", above n 14, at 1697.  
50  Property (Relationships) Act, s 1M.  
51   Alexander "Pluralism and Property", above n 17, at 1023.  
52  Property (Relationships) Act, s 1N. 
53  Bill Atkin "What Kind of Property is 'Relationship Property'?" (2016) 47 VUWLR 345 at 345.  
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is that "property", under the Act, should not be understood formally "by reference to the powers and 
rights it gives the owner", but rather functionally "by reference to the impacts of the exercise of this 
power on others and the shape and character of the social relationships engendered by those rights 
and powers".54  
It should have come as no surprise to the academic and legal community that "property" under the 
Property (Relationships) Act has been interpreted functionally and not formally. For instance, in 
Walker v Walker, the Court of Appeal viewed a debt that was owed to the husband by a discretionary 
family trust as "relationship property".55 Since the husband had "control" over the corporate trustee 
company, the debt was attached to a "package of assets" that were exercised by the husband.56 This 
"package", according to the Court of Appeal, "should have been valued on an assumption that they 
were for sale together" when "maximising the value of the relationship property".57 If we accept that 
"property" for the purposes of the Act ought to be understood with reference to the "the shape and 
character of the social relationships engendered by" rights and powers,58 then a court ought to view 
the trust in functional terms. By doing so, the power to appoint and remove directors of a trustee 
company, and the power appoint and remove trustees of the trust, can contribute to the package of 
assets that is classified as "property" for the purposes of the Act. 
This approach to "property" under the Property (Relationships) Act was subsequently followed 
by Harrison v Harrison.59 Here, a husband and wife settled a family trust with a trust company as the 
trustee. The High Court held that since the trustee company was under the control of the parties, the 
"substantial effect of the arrangement"60 was that the parties controlled the trust61 and "the legal and 
equitable estates unite in the husband and wife."62 On an application to the Court of Appeal, rather 
than viewing the trust as ineffective, the Court observed that:63 
  
54  Joseph William Singer "Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society" (2009) 94 
Cornell L Rev 1009 at 1047.  
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56  Walker, above n 55, at [48].  
57  At [60]. 
58  Singer, above n 54, at 1047.  
59  Harrison v Harrison (2008) 27 FRNZ 202 (HC) [Harrison (HC)]; Harrison v Harrison [2009] NZCA 68, 
[2009] NZFLR 687 [Harrison (CA)]; and Gush, above n 55, at 160.  
60  Harrison (HC), above n 59, at [22].  
61  At [25].  
62  At [26].  
63  Harrison (CA), above n 59, at [10].  
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… there was a bundle of rights associated with their positions as discretionary beneficiaries under the 
[trust company], and as the joint holders of the power of appointment of the [trust company] trustees. 
The same approach was adopted by the Supreme Court in Clayton v Clayton.64 In this case, the 
sole trustee was also a "discretionary beneficiary" and exercised broad powers of discretionary 
distribution of income and capital, amendment, self-benefit, appointment and removal of trustees and 
beneficiaries. Rather than finding that the trust was ineffective (or illusory), the Supreme Court held 
that the sole trustee's ability to exercise "the [trust] powers in his own favour to the detriment of the 
Final Beneficiaries" in a manner that is "unrestrained by fiduciary obligations" meant that these 
powers amount to "property" under the Property (Relationships) Act.65 The legislative intervention 
required a shift in focus from form to function, and once viewed functionally, the sole trustee (and 
"discretionary beneficiary") powers "to transfer, confer rights in, or otherwise dispose of … the right 
to possess tangibles" were a proprietary interest that ought to be reallocated under the Act.66 
Hence, we can begin to see how the "bundle of rights" theory takes shape. It represents an 
interpretative approach to legislation that seeks to reallocate or redistribute "property". The theory 
encourages a functional approach to the meaning of "property", recognising that law reform is often 
concerned with the structure of the social relationships that property institutions facilitate, rather that 
the juridical structure itself. More broadly, this functional approach is required regardless of whether 
the "property" in question concerns a financial debt to a creditor underpinned by corrective justice 
norms, the social debt to a former husband or wife underlined by distributive justice norms or the 
social obligation to contribute to public revenue gathering.  
Let me, therefore, articulate the coherent basis to "the bundle of rights" approach. The social 
institution of property engages a plurality of values. Legislation may seek to reallocate or redistribute 
"property" in order to pursue a moral vision of the type of social relationships that ought to be 
fostered.67 It does so by making "policy-motivated adjustments" to the sticks in the bundle of rights.68 
When applying allocative or redistributive legislative provisions, courts ought to adopt a functionalist 
interpretation of the term "property". Where the asset, object or resource in question is subject to a 
general discretionary trust, a functional interpretation of "property" is inclusive of a beneficiary's 
ability to require that the trustees exercise their powers of transfer, disposition and realisation of value 
in favour of him or her. Such an approach is inconsistent with the juridical principles of trust law, and 
  
64  Clayton v Clayton [2016] NZSC 29, [2016] NZFLR 230.  
65  At [58]. 
66  Penner "The (True) Nature of a Beneficiary's Equitable Proprietary Interest under a Trust", above n 29, at 
487. 
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68   Henry E Smith "Property as the Law of Things", above n 14, at 1697. 
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that is the entire point. Legislative reform has never been beholden to mantra of the Chancery. Nor 
should it be. 
Finally, the reason why the bundle of rights theory is restricted to legislative intervention is 
because the statutory provisions provide both the catalyst for the shift from form to function and the 
injection of a plurality of values. It is legislation that can provide additional protection for residential 
tenants and creditors, govern relationship property division and intellectual property rights, preserve 
historical features and access to legal aid, manage environmental resources, gather public revenue and 
so on. It is legislation that confronts the task of arbitrating between the individual preference 
satisfaction norms and social obligation norms. This requires balancing what is good for a person, 
what that person values, and what he or she rationally prefers,69 against the obligations on the same 
person "to provide to the society of which the individual is a member those benefits that the society 
reasonably regards as necessary".70 What is much less clear is whether this value pluralistic task can 
be achieved independent of statutory intervention. We can now turn to consider this final question.  
B The Illusory Trust  
Recall the implication that I drew at the end of Part I(B): if the moral ends of trust law is settlor 
autonomy, then there are no limits to the configuration of powers that the law has reason to give effect 
to. Equally, if we seek to provide a limit to the settlor exercising his or her autonomy by requiring 
particular beneficiaries' rights or trustees' obligations, we need to identify something of value to 
counteract the settlor autonomy norm. As I will explain here, those who seek to identify an internal 
limit to the concept of a trust, where the trust becomes "illusory" if it exceeds the limit, must confront 
the second formulation of the implication. Unlike the bundle of rights argument, which is able to draw 
upon a plurality of values by virtue of statutory provisions that introduced values beyond the value of 
settlor autonomy, the concept of the illusory trust relies upon the idea that trust law itself serves a 
plurality of values. 
In terms of there being a limit to the concept of the trust, we are concerned here with 
"arrangements that were subjectively intended to create an express trust, but are found not to do so 
because of the control formally provided to the trustee or settlor".71 That even when a settlor intended 
a particular configuration of powers, it does not conform to the standard "package of legal incidents"72 
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or "package of constituent elements"73 that the law requires "when parties choose to use the trust 
institution to order their affairs".74 At which point, the elasticity of the trust concept "is stretched to 
breaking point",75 the "trust for beneficiaries then becomes a bare resulting trust for the settlor",76 and 
the "apparent trust created by the settlor would be unreal".77 There must be, in other words, some way 
of delineating the concept of the trust to give effect to the idea that a trustee holds property as a trustee, 
and not, as a bare property rights-holder.78  
Formally, of course, the trustee is the property rights-holder. The trustee exercises the right to 
exclude – exercises the "rights in the trust property" – that are nonetheless rights subject to 
"obligations owed by the trustee to the beneficiary".79 It then follows that, provided the trustee is 
under obligations that are owed to the beneficiaries, the trustee is not a bare property rights-holder. 
The juridical form of the trust, therefore, requires a set of obligations that are imposed on the trustee(s) 
and owed to the beneficiaries, in order to sustain the concept of the trust. For instance, one way to 
formally delineate the concept of the trust is to focus on how the obligations imposed on the trustee 
creates a "relationship of accountability between trustee and beneficiary.80 It then follows that "if the 
settlor does not confer upon so-called 'beneficiaries' any formal rights to make the trustee account to 
them",81 the ostensible trust has reached beyond the formal limits of the trust. 
Note that it might be tempting to add to the conceptual account of the trust the observation that 
such obligations are fiduciary obligations. However, the fiduciary dimension to a fiduciary obligation 
concerns a particular manner in which the obligation ought to be performed; it ought to be performed 
with loyalty, faithfulness or some other justiciable motive.82 The manner in which an obligation is 
required to be performed is logically subsequent to the content of the obligation itself (ie the actions 
that are required to be performed). The idea that there is a limit to the concept of the trust is constructed 
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by the imposition of obligations of particular content (that may subsequently require a particular 
manner or motive of performance).  
Recent commentary has sought to further delineate the concept of the illusory trust in the wake of 
the Supreme Court's decision in Clayton v Clayton. Mark Bennett provides an excellent account of 
these different formulations.83 Although the Supreme Court did not rely on the illusory trust concept, 
the Court nonetheless acknowledged that the retention of broad powers by the settlor "may bring into 
question whether the irreducible core of Trustee obligations" exists.84 These recent attempts to further 
delineate the concept of the illusory trust rely upon a shift from form to function. That is, they require 
the courts to look beyond the juridical relationship between trustee and beneficiary into the structure 
of social relations that the trust is giving effect to with regards to the trust property. As I will explain, 
this functionalist turn requires an explanation of why courts should look beyond the juridical form, 
and more importantly, this functionalist turn necessitates an explanation of the values that inform the 
functional limits of the concept of the trust. 
One way to extend the concept of the illusory trust is to expand upon the relationship of 
accountability and require "meaningful accountability".85 The suggestion here is that even where there 
are duties to account imposed on the trustees, where the substance of the trust structure precludes 
trustees being held accountable by the beneficiaries, the settlor intention to create a trust can be called 
into doubt. Such an approach requires the courts to look at "[t]he reality of how the trust was structured 
and what the various powers conferred on [the trustee are]",86 and to depart from a "formulaic 
analysis" of trust intention to take "take account of substance and conduct".87 This "inquiry as to 
substance"88 is concerned with how beneficiaries' rights function to require that trustees exercise their 
powers of transfer, disposition and realisation of value in a particular way. It is, in other words, 
concerned with how the powers under the trust are functionally configured and exercised. 
Another way to expand the concept of the illusory trust is to view a trustee's ability to benefit from 
the trust (or benefit to a particular degree) to be inconsistent with the role of a trustee.89 Tobias 
Barkley, for instance, posits that "the purpose of trusts … is to provide legal recognition for an 
important category of social relationship" that is "created when one person promises to use property 
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or assets they own, receive or have control over for the benefit of someone or something other than 
him or herself".90 Note that Barkley then attempts to justify this claim on the basis that it is "consistent 
with a long line of judicial statements on the nature of trusts".91 Barkley's claim is, nonetheless, a 
functional claim about how trust law facilities the structure of social relations with people and 
property, specifically with reference to the entitlements of use, transfer, control and income. 
A third way is to look "beyond the strict legal form of the arrangement to examine whether in 
substance or 'reality' the powers provided in the trust deed" enable the settlor or trustee to "have the 
benefit of the property".92 As Bennett explains, according to this "reality of control view", the trust 
will be illusory where they settlor retains powers under the trust to "give binding directions for 
investment", to "give or withhold consent for the exercise of the trustee's powers", to "replace trustees 
or protectors, to direct the distribution of trust assets contrary to the terms of the trust deed", or to "act 
as a director of a company whose shares are owned by the trust".93 This view is clearly a functional 
view of the limits of the trust; there are certain powers under the trust that crystallise around the 
"powers of title" and cannot be exercised by the settlor despite the settlor's intention to retain such 
powers.  
More broadly, all three views briefly considered here require a functional shift. That is, all three 
views seek to look beyond the juridical relationship between trustee and beneficiary to assess whether 
the trust has the effect of creating a structure of social relations whereby the trustees or settlor exercise 
the powers of transfer, disposition and realisation of value in a way that is somehow inconsistent with 
the concept of the trust.  
Consider now the contrast between the bundle of rights argument and the concept of the illusory 
trust. There are two points of contrast. Unlike the bundle of rights argument that is predicated on 
statutory intervention, there appears to be no catalyst for the shift from viewing the trust in terms of 
juridical relationships, to viewing the trust in terms of how the powers of transfer, disposition and 
realisation of value are exercised "in substance" or "in reality". Absent statutory intervention, the 
juridical principles of equity will apply.94  
Moreover, unlike the bundle of rights argument that is animated by the pluralistic rationale behind 
the statutory intervention, it remains unarticulated what value is being invoked to act as a ballast or 
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counterweight against respect for settlor autonomy. We need this "ballast value" to furnish the law 
with reasons not to give effect to the configuration of rights, powers, and privileges that the settlor 
intended. Otherwise, absent a ballast value, we have to accept the singular moral ends of trust law as 
giving effect to settlor autonomy. And by accepting value monism, we arrive at a "strong version" of 
a "freedom of trust" principle, whereby:95 
… so long as the legal arrangement of rights and duties voluntarily undertaken by the parties has some 
kind of workable legal effect, the law should give effect to it; it is not the role of the law to require parties 
to a legal arrangement to accept a standard "package" of terms … 
Relying upon iterations of "the essential historical character of the trust"96 does not explain why 
"the law should prohibit [a] settlor from creating trusts which differ from the trust concept as 
traditionally understood".97 Even identifying "axiomatic principles", "a long line of judicial 
statements on the nature of trusts",98 or repeating the "recurrent themes of accountability and 
enforceability" in the trust law,99 does not explain the way in which accountability, enforceability, or 
any other "category of social relationship",100 are ballast values internal to trust law.  
In the same way that "[e]xclusion is … not a value at all",101 "meaningful" accountability, a 
sufficient degree of selflessness or limited control are not valuable in and of themselves. In order for 
the concept of the illusory trust to have a coherent basis, we need an understanding of some moral 
end, that is being served by requiring "meaningful" accountability, limiting self-benefit, or limiting 
effective control, that (in some circumstances at least) is more valuable than settlor autonomy. 
Moreover, if we are to identify what form of accountability is not "meaningful" accountability, what 
degree of self-benefit is too beneficial, or what degree of control is "effective" control, we need to 
understand the value or norm that animates this limit to the settlor's intention (and the autonomy or 
preference satisfaction that the intention represents). Rather than there being "[n]o coherent basis for 
the bundle of rights" argument,102 there has instead been no coherent basis for the concept of the 
illusory trust articulated to date. 
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This conclusion should not be interpreted as a defence of the freedom of trust principle. Far from 
it. This article seeks to better identify the enemy in order to better combat it. Property rights are value 
monistic, and it is because there are values beyond individual preference satisfaction that we "use a 
combination of common law, statutes, and social custom to define the boundaries of allowable 
packages of property rights".103 Trust law, I have suggested, is also value monistic. Seeking to find 
normative limits to the concept of a trust from within trust law is akin to staging an intervention for 
an addict by inviting only drug dealers. Rather, we need to look outside trust law and apply legal tools 
that have a value pluralistic basis. One answer, I have suggested, lies with the bundle of rights 
argument. This argument requires a functionalist interpretation of legislative provisions that seek to 
reallocate and redistribute "property", whether the legislation concerns creditors, relationship 
property, legal aid, taxation, or any other instance where a social obligation outweighs individual 
preference satisfaction.  
III CONCLUSION  
When we ask, "is this power property?" or "what is the nature of the beneficial interest?", we do 
not isolate the explanandum that requires explanation. We can ask, with more clarity, whether a right 
is a property right and whether a right is governed by property law. We can also ask, with more 
clarity, what the juridical nature of the beneficial interest is and what the functional nature of the 
beneficial interest is. Once we isolate these distinct explananda, we can then view the ostensibly 
competing explanans as different explanans for different explananda.  
It then becomes a question of which lens we ought to adopt. Adopting a formal lens helps us 
understand the juridical relationship between rights-holders and duty-bearers. Adopting a functional 
lens helps us understand the social relationship between people and property that the law facilitates. 
It is this functional lens that enables us to see a plurality of values that property institutions can serve. 
The bundle of rights argument is an argument in favour of adopting the functional lens. Where 
legislation seeks to make adjustments and reallocations to the sticks in the bundle of rights in light of 
a plurality of values, what amounts to a "property" interest ought to be interpreted functionally. The 
recent attempts to delineate the concept of the illusory trust also represent a functional shift, in an 
attempt to view the "substance" or reality" of the trust. However, without identifying a plurality of 
values that trust law itself seeks to serve, the limit to the concept of the trust will remain illusory. 
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